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1.
Mancini, Francesco
Sulla necessità degli scopi come determinanti prossimi della sofferenza psicopatologica Journal Article
In: vol. 13, no 1, pp. 7-20, 2016.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: beliefs, clinical cognitivism, cognitive processes, goals
@article{Mancini2016,
title = {Sulla necessità degli scopi come determinanti prossimi della sofferenza psicopatologica},
author = {Francesco Mancini},
editor = {Franco Angeli Editore},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/02Mancini16-1.pdf},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-06-01},
volume = {13},
number = {1},
pages = {7-20},
abstract = {In this article one of the most signifi cant limits of Clinical Cognitivism is highlighted: the scarce relevance
attributed to “goals” in explaining psychopathology. In the standard Clinical Cognitivism the role of beliefs
and cognitive processes is highly stressed, while the role of goals in orienting the cognitive processes, and
thus, in the development and maintenance of beliefs, is neglected. It is, in current Clinical Cognitivism, the
recourse to dispositional concepts ‒ e.g. intolerance to uncertainty ‒ which appear to be more descriptive than
explanatory, and to cognitive defi cits, which are open to several criticism},
keywords = {beliefs, clinical cognitivism, cognitive processes, goals},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this article one of the most signifi cant limits of Clinical Cognitivism is highlighted: the scarce relevance
attributed to “goals” in explaining psychopathology. In the standard Clinical Cognitivism the role of beliefs
and cognitive processes is highly stressed, while the role of goals in orienting the cognitive processes, and
thus, in the development and maintenance of beliefs, is neglected. It is, in current Clinical Cognitivism, the
recourse to dispositional concepts ‒ e.g. intolerance to uncertainty ‒ which appear to be more descriptive than
explanatory, and to cognitive defi cits, which are open to several criticism
attributed to “goals” in explaining psychopathology. In the standard Clinical Cognitivism the role of beliefs
and cognitive processes is highly stressed, while the role of goals in orienting the cognitive processes, and
thus, in the development and maintenance of beliefs, is neglected. It is, in current Clinical Cognitivism, the
recourse to dispositional concepts ‒ e.g. intolerance to uncertainty ‒ which appear to be more descriptive than
explanatory, and to cognitive defi cits, which are open to several criticism
2.
Mancini, Francesco; Barcaccia, Barbara
Do we need a cognitive theory for obsessive-compulsive disorder? Yes, we do Journal Article
In: Clinical Neuropsychiatry, vol. 11, no 6, pp. 197-203, 2014.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: appraisal theory, beliefs, cognitive deficits, goals, obsessive-compulsive disorder
@article{Mancini2014,
title = {Do we need a cognitive theory for obsessive-compulsive disorder? Yes, we do},
author = {Francesco Mancini and Barbara Barcaccia},
editor = {Giovanni Fioriti Editore s.r.l.},
url = {http://www.clinicalneuropsychiatry.org/pdf/14-6Mancini.pdf},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-05-01},
journal = {Clinical Neuropsychiatry},
volume = {11},
number = {6},
pages = {197-203},
abstract = {Nowadays a general trend in psychiatry and clinical psychology, claming to explain mental illness and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) in particular as a neurological disease, seems to be in ascendant. The purpose of this position paper is to rebut this perspective on OCD and demonstrate that an Appraisal Theory (AT) of the disorder, is necessary and sufficient in order to account for proximal determinants in the genesis (proximal determinants) and maintenance of OC sympomatology.},
keywords = {appraisal theory, beliefs, cognitive deficits, goals, obsessive-compulsive disorder},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Nowadays a general trend in psychiatry and clinical psychology, claming to explain mental illness and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) in particular as a neurological disease, seems to be in ascendant. The purpose of this position paper is to rebut this perspective on OCD and demonstrate that an Appraisal Theory (AT) of the disorder, is necessary and sufficient in order to account for proximal determinants in the genesis (proximal determinants) and maintenance of OC sympomatology.
3.
Gangemi, Amelia; Mancini, Francesco; Johnson-Laird, P. N.
Models and cognitive change in psychopathology Journal Article
In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, vol. 25, no 2, pp. 157-164, 2013.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: beliefs, Emotions, Hyper-emotion theory, Psychological illnesses, reasoning, Syllogisms
@article{Gangemi2013,
title = {Models and cognitive change in psychopathology},
author = {Amelia Gangemi and Francesco Mancini and P. N. Johnson-Laird},
editor = {Psychology Press},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/2012_models_and_cognitive_change_in_psychopathology.pdf},
doi = {10.1080/20445911.2012.737318},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
journal = {Journal of Cognitive Psychology},
volume = {25},
number = {2},
pages = {157-164},
abstract = {The hyper-emotion theory attributes psychological illnesses to emotions of aberrant intensity, which in turn prompt better reasoning about their causes. Two experiments in which participants drew their own conclusions from syllogistic premises tested this prediction. Individuals from the same populations as the experimental participants rated the believability of likely conclusions. One experiment compared patients with depression with controls, and the other experiment compared students scoring high on anxiety with controls. Controls tended to draw believable conclusions and not to draw unbelievable conclusions, and this belief bias was greater for invalid inferences. The clinical groups were better reasoners than the controls, and did not show belief bias. As our hypothesis predicted, they drew many more valid conclusions concerning their illness than controls drew valid believable conclusions. But, contrary to the hypothesis, they refrained from drawing invalid conclusions about neutral topics more than controls refrained from drawing invalid unbelievable conclusions.},
keywords = {beliefs, Emotions, Hyper-emotion theory, Psychological illnesses, reasoning, Syllogisms},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The hyper-emotion theory attributes psychological illnesses to emotions of aberrant intensity, which in turn prompt better reasoning about their causes. Two experiments in which participants drew their own conclusions from syllogistic premises tested this prediction. Individuals from the same populations as the experimental participants rated the believability of likely conclusions. One experiment compared patients with depression with controls, and the other experiment compared students scoring high on anxiety with controls. Controls tended to draw believable conclusions and not to draw unbelievable conclusions, and this belief bias was greater for invalid inferences. The clinical groups were better reasoners than the controls, and did not show belief bias. As our hypothesis predicted, they drew many more valid conclusions concerning their illness than controls drew valid believable conclusions. But, contrary to the hypothesis, they refrained from drawing invalid conclusions about neutral topics more than controls refrained from drawing invalid unbelievable conclusions.
4.
Mancini, Francesco; Gangemi, Amelia
Fear of guilt from behaving irresponsibly in obsessive–compulsive disorder Journal Article
In: Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, vol. 35, no 2, pp. 109 - 120, 2004, ISSN: 0005-7916, (Experimental approaches to understanding OCD).
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: beliefs, guilt, OCD, Responsibility
@article{Mancini2004109,
title = {Fear of guilt from behaving irresponsibly in obsessive–compulsive disorder},
author = {Francesco Mancini and Amelia Gangemi},
editor = {Elsevier ScienceDirect},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Fear-of-guilt-from-behaving-irresponsibly-in-obsessive-compulsive-disorder-Mancini_Gangemi.pdf},
doi = {10.1016/j.jbtep.2004.04.003},
issn = {0005-7916},
year = {2004},
date = {2004-01-01},
journal = {Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry},
volume = {35},
number = {2},
pages = {109 - 120},
abstract = {Previous cognitive models of obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) propose that inflated responsibility plays a key role in the maintenance of symptoms (Behav.Res.Ther. 28 (1985) 571). In this manuscript, we propose that this thesis may be improved by emphasizing that instead, OCD may be characterized by a fear of guilt that would result from behaving irresponsibly and/or from not behaving responsibly. We believe that this concept provides a better explanation for the anxious and fearful nature of OCD than do more traditional conceptualizations of inflated responsibility. We support this idea with empirical evidence and propose that OCD symptoms are consistent with patients acting in a prudential mode because of their fears of guilt.},
note = {Experimental approaches to understanding OCD},
keywords = {beliefs, guilt, OCD, Responsibility},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Previous cognitive models of obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) propose that inflated responsibility plays a key role in the maintenance of symptoms (Behav.Res.Ther. 28 (1985) 571). In this manuscript, we propose that this thesis may be improved by emphasizing that instead, OCD may be characterized by a fear of guilt that would result from behaving irresponsibly and/or from not behaving responsibly. We believe that this concept provides a better explanation for the anxious and fearful nature of OCD than do more traditional conceptualizations of inflated responsibility. We support this idea with empirical evidence and propose that OCD symptoms are consistent with patients acting in a prudential mode because of their fears of guilt.