Ricerca pubblicazioni scientifiche

@article{Gangemi2013,

title = {Models and cognitive change in psychopathology},

author = {Amelia Gangemi and Francesco Mancini and P. N. Johnson-Laird},

editor = {Psychology Press},

url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/2012_models_and_cognitive_change_in_psychopathology.pdf},

doi = {10.1080/20445911.2012.737318},

year  = {2013},

date = {2013-01-01},

journal = {Journal of Cognitive Psychology},

volume = {25},

number = {2},

pages = {157-164},

abstract = {The hyper-emotion theory attributes psychological illnesses to emotions of aberrant intensity, which in turn prompt better reasoning about their causes. Two experiments in which participants drew their own conclusions from syllogistic premises tested this prediction. Individuals from the same populations as the experimental participants rated the believability of likely conclusions. One experiment compared patients with depression with controls, and the other experiment compared students scoring high on anxiety with controls. Controls tended to draw believable conclusions and not to draw unbelievable conclusions, and this belief bias was greater for invalid inferences. The clinical groups were better reasoners than the controls, and did not show belief bias. As our hypothesis predicted, they drew many more valid conclusions concerning their illness than controls drew valid believable conclusions. But, contrary to the hypothesis, they refrained from drawing invalid conclusions about neutral topics more than controls refrained from drawing invalid unbelievable conclusions.},

keywords = {beliefs, Emotions, Hyper-emotion theory, Psychological illnesses, reasoning, Syllogisms},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Johnson-Laird2006,

title = {A hyper-emotion theory of psychological illnesse},

author = {Philippe N. Johnson-Laird and Francesco Mancini and Amelia Gangemi},

editor = {the American Psychological Association},

url = {http://mentalmodels.princeton.edu/papers/2006hyperemotiontheory.pdf},

doi = {10.1037/0033-295X.113.4.822},

year  = {2006},

date = {2006-01-01},

journal = {Psychological Review 113, No. 4, 822–841},

volume = {113},

number = {4},

pages = {822–841},

abstract = {A “hyper-emotion” theory of psychological illnesses is presented. The theory postulates the processes that construct bodily feelings and basic emotions are computationally crude and outside voluntary control. Psychological illnesses have an onset in which a cognitive evaluation initiates a sequence of unconscious transitions yielding a basic emotion.

This emotion is appropriate for the situation but inappropriate in its intensity. Whenever it recurs, it leads individuals to focus on the precipitating situation, and to characteristic patterns of inference that can bolster the illness. Individuals with a propensity to psychological illness accordingly reason better than more robust individuals, but only on topics relevant to their illness. The theory is assessed in light of previous studies, a small epidemiological study of patients, and three empirical studies},

keywords = {cognitive therapy, Emotions, Psychological illnesses, reasoning, unconscious processes},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}