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1.
Mancini, Francesco
Sulla necessità degli scopi come determinanti prossimi della sofferenza psicopatologica Journal Article
In: vol. 13, no 1, pp. 7-20, 2016.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: beliefs, clinical cognitivism, cognitive processes, goals
@article{Mancini2016,
title = {Sulla necessità degli scopi come determinanti prossimi della sofferenza psicopatologica},
author = {Francesco Mancini},
editor = {Franco Angeli Editore},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/02Mancini16-1.pdf},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-06-01},
volume = {13},
number = {1},
pages = {7-20},
abstract = {In this article one of the most signifi cant limits of Clinical Cognitivism is highlighted: the scarce relevance
attributed to “goals” in explaining psychopathology. In the standard Clinical Cognitivism the role of beliefs
and cognitive processes is highly stressed, while the role of goals in orienting the cognitive processes, and
thus, in the development and maintenance of beliefs, is neglected. It is, in current Clinical Cognitivism, the
recourse to dispositional concepts ‒ e.g. intolerance to uncertainty ‒ which appear to be more descriptive than
explanatory, and to cognitive defi cits, which are open to several criticism},
keywords = {beliefs, clinical cognitivism, cognitive processes, goals},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this article one of the most signifi cant limits of Clinical Cognitivism is highlighted: the scarce relevance
attributed to “goals” in explaining psychopathology. In the standard Clinical Cognitivism the role of beliefs
and cognitive processes is highly stressed, while the role of goals in orienting the cognitive processes, and
thus, in the development and maintenance of beliefs, is neglected. It is, in current Clinical Cognitivism, the
recourse to dispositional concepts ‒ e.g. intolerance to uncertainty ‒ which appear to be more descriptive than
explanatory, and to cognitive defi cits, which are open to several criticism
attributed to “goals” in explaining psychopathology. In the standard Clinical Cognitivism the role of beliefs
and cognitive processes is highly stressed, while the role of goals in orienting the cognitive processes, and
thus, in the development and maintenance of beliefs, is neglected. It is, in current Clinical Cognitivism, the
recourse to dispositional concepts ‒ e.g. intolerance to uncertainty ‒ which appear to be more descriptive than
explanatory, and to cognitive defi cits, which are open to several criticism
2.
Mancini, Francesco; Barcaccia, Barbara
Do we need a cognitive theory for obsessive-compulsive disorder? Yes, we do Journal Article
In: Clinical Neuropsychiatry, vol. 11, no 6, pp. 197-203, 2014.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: appraisal theory, beliefs, cognitive deficits, goals, obsessive-compulsive disorder
@article{Mancini2014,
title = {Do we need a cognitive theory for obsessive-compulsive disorder? Yes, we do},
author = {Francesco Mancini and Barbara Barcaccia},
editor = {Giovanni Fioriti Editore s.r.l.},
url = {http://www.clinicalneuropsychiatry.org/pdf/14-6Mancini.pdf},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-05-01},
journal = {Clinical Neuropsychiatry},
volume = {11},
number = {6},
pages = {197-203},
abstract = {Nowadays a general trend in psychiatry and clinical psychology, claming to explain mental illness and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) in particular as a neurological disease, seems to be in ascendant. The purpose of this position paper is to rebut this perspective on OCD and demonstrate that an Appraisal Theory (AT) of the disorder, is necessary and sufficient in order to account for proximal determinants in the genesis (proximal determinants) and maintenance of OC sympomatology.},
keywords = {appraisal theory, beliefs, cognitive deficits, goals, obsessive-compulsive disorder},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Nowadays a general trend in psychiatry and clinical psychology, claming to explain mental illness and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) in particular as a neurological disease, seems to be in ascendant. The purpose of this position paper is to rebut this perspective on OCD and demonstrate that an Appraisal Theory (AT) of the disorder, is necessary and sufficient in order to account for proximal determinants in the genesis (proximal determinants) and maintenance of OC sympomatology.