Cerca una Pubblicazione
1.
Migliore, Simone; D'Aurizio, Giulia; Parisi, Francesca; Maffi, Sabrina; Squitieri, Barbara; Curcio, Giuseppe; Mancini, Francesco
Moral Judgment and empathic/Deontological Guilt Journal Article
In: Psychological Reports, pp. 1-17, 2018.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: altruistic, decision-making, deontological, Emotions, guilt, moral dilemma
@article{Migliore2018,
title = {Moral Judgment and empathic/Deontological Guilt},
author = {Simone Migliore and Giulia D'Aurizio and Francesca Parisi and Sabrina Maffi and Barbara Squitieri and Giuseppe Curcio and Francesco Mancini},
editor = {Sage},
url = {https://apc.it/2018_moral-judgment-and-empathic_-deontological-guilt/},
doi = {doi.org/10.1177/0033294118787500},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-07-19},
journal = {Psychological Reports},
pages = {1-17},
abstract = {People often make complicated decisions to help or to punish perfect strangers. Harming someone or breaking some moral imperative is usually linked to feeling guilt, and several researches suggested the existence of two different kinds of guilt: altruistic/empathic and deontological.
Aim
Our study aimed to investigate the decision-making processes in moral and nonmoral judgments and assess how specific situations in which the subject is close to the victim or flanked by an authority can influence his decisions.
Methods
We used three different moral conditions: Empathic Moral (the decision has made while physically close to the potential victims), Deontological Moral (the decision has made while flanked by an “authority”), and Standard Moral (without any influence); a fourth condition is represented by Nonmoral dilemmas (the subject must make a choice between two different things and this does not cause any harm or victims). Previously, a pilot study was carried out for validating the experimental stories to be used in the main study.
Results
We observed a higher number of utilitarian/positive responses when individuals had to respond to Empathic Moral condition, with respect to Deontological Moral and Nonmoral dilemmas. Moreover, looking at the time needed to read the dilemma, under empathic guilt condition, people tended to be slower in reading the dilemmas than in other conditions and this both in case of positive and negative responses. No significant differences in time needed to effectively respond emerged.
Conclusions
These findings suggested that be physically close to potential victims or be flanked by an “authority” differentially influence the decision-making processes in moral judgment, inducing slower decisions and more utilitarian answers, particularly in the scenario of physical proximity.},
keywords = {altruistic, decision-making, deontological, Emotions, guilt, moral dilemma},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
People often make complicated decisions to help or to punish perfect strangers. Harming someone or breaking some moral imperative is usually linked to feeling guilt, and several researches suggested the existence of two different kinds of guilt: altruistic/empathic and deontological.
Aim
Our study aimed to investigate the decision-making processes in moral and nonmoral judgments and assess how specific situations in which the subject is close to the victim or flanked by an authority can influence his decisions.
Methods
We used three different moral conditions: Empathic Moral (the decision has made while physically close to the potential victims), Deontological Moral (the decision has made while flanked by an “authority”), and Standard Moral (without any influence); a fourth condition is represented by Nonmoral dilemmas (the subject must make a choice between two different things and this does not cause any harm or victims). Previously, a pilot study was carried out for validating the experimental stories to be used in the main study.
Results
We observed a higher number of utilitarian/positive responses when individuals had to respond to Empathic Moral condition, with respect to Deontological Moral and Nonmoral dilemmas. Moreover, looking at the time needed to read the dilemma, under empathic guilt condition, people tended to be slower in reading the dilemmas than in other conditions and this both in case of positive and negative responses. No significant differences in time needed to effectively respond emerged.
Conclusions
These findings suggested that be physically close to potential victims or be flanked by an “authority” differentially influence the decision-making processes in moral judgment, inducing slower decisions and more utilitarian answers, particularly in the scenario of physical proximity.
Aim
Our study aimed to investigate the decision-making processes in moral and nonmoral judgments and assess how specific situations in which the subject is close to the victim or flanked by an authority can influence his decisions.
Methods
We used three different moral conditions: Empathic Moral (the decision has made while physically close to the potential victims), Deontological Moral (the decision has made while flanked by an “authority”), and Standard Moral (without any influence); a fourth condition is represented by Nonmoral dilemmas (the subject must make a choice between two different things and this does not cause any harm or victims). Previously, a pilot study was carried out for validating the experimental stories to be used in the main study.
Results
We observed a higher number of utilitarian/positive responses when individuals had to respond to Empathic Moral condition, with respect to Deontological Moral and Nonmoral dilemmas. Moreover, looking at the time needed to read the dilemma, under empathic guilt condition, people tended to be slower in reading the dilemmas than in other conditions and this both in case of positive and negative responses. No significant differences in time needed to effectively respond emerged.
Conclusions
These findings suggested that be physically close to potential victims or be flanked by an “authority” differentially influence the decision-making processes in moral judgment, inducing slower decisions and more utilitarian answers, particularly in the scenario of physical proximity.
2.
Basile, Barbara; Mancini, Francesco; Macaluso, Emiliano; Caltagirone, Carlo; Frackowiak, Richard S. J.; Bozzali, Marco
Deontological and Altruistic Guilt: Evidence for Distinct Neurobiological Substrates Journal Article
In: Human Brain Mapping , no 2, pp. 229–239, 2011.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: altruistic, anterior cingulate cortex, deontological, Emotion, fMRI, guilt
@article{Macaluso2011,
title = {Deontological and Altruistic Guilt: Evidence for Distinct Neurobiological Substrates},
author = {Barbara Basile and Francesco Mancini and Emiliano Macaluso and Carlo Caltagirone and Richard S.J. Frackowiak and Marco Bozzali},
editor = {Neuroimaging Laboratory},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Deontological%20and%20Altruistic%20Guilt_%20Evidence%20for%20Distinct%20Neurobiological%20%20Substrates%20(mancini%20et%20al).pdf},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-01-01},
journal = {Human Brain Mapping },
number = {2},
pages = {229–239},
abstract = {The feeling of guilt is a complex mental state underlying several human behaviors in both private and social life. From a psychological and evolutionary viewpoint, guilt is an emotional and cognitive function, characterized by prosocial sentiments, entailing specific moral believes, which can be predominantly driven by inner values (deontological guilt) or by more interpersonal situations (altruistic guilt). The aim of this study was to investigate whether there is a distinct neurobiological substrate for these two expressions of guilt in healthy individuals. We first run two behavioral studies, recruiting a sample of 72 healthy volunteers, to validate a set of stimuli selectively evoking deontological and altruistic guilt, or basic control emotions (i.e., anger and sadness). Similar stimuli were reproduced in a event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm, to investigate the neural correlates of the same emotions, in a new sample of 22 healthy volunteers. We show that guilty emotions, compared to anger and sadness, activate specific brain areas (i.e., cingulate gyrus and medial frontal cortex) and that different neuronal networks are involved in each specific kind of guilt, with the insula selectively responding to deontological guilt stimuli. },
keywords = {altruistic, anterior cingulate cortex, deontological, Emotion, fMRI, guilt},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The feeling of guilt is a complex mental state underlying several human behaviors in both private and social life. From a psychological and evolutionary viewpoint, guilt is an emotional and cognitive function, characterized by prosocial sentiments, entailing specific moral believes, which can be predominantly driven by inner values (deontological guilt) or by more interpersonal situations (altruistic guilt). The aim of this study was to investigate whether there is a distinct neurobiological substrate for these two expressions of guilt in healthy individuals. We first run two behavioral studies, recruiting a sample of 72 healthy volunteers, to validate a set of stimuli selectively evoking deontological and altruistic guilt, or basic control emotions (i.e., anger and sadness). Similar stimuli were reproduced in a event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm, to investigate the neural correlates of the same emotions, in a new sample of 22 healthy volunteers. We show that guilty emotions, compared to anger and sadness, activate specific brain areas (i.e., cingulate gyrus and medial frontal cortex) and that different neuronal networks are involved in each specific kind of guilt, with the insula selectively responding to deontological guilt stimuli.