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1.
Gangemi, Amelia; Mancini, Francesco; Johnson-Laird, P. N.
Emotion, reasoning, and psychopathology Miscellaneous
2013, ISBN: 978-1-84872-118-0.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: Emotion, reasoning
@misc{Blanchette2013,
title = {Emotion, reasoning, and psychopathology},
author = {Amelia Gangemi and Francesco Mancini and P.N. Johnson-Laird},
editor = {Isabelle Blanchette and Psychology Press},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/emotion-reasoning-and-psychopathology-Gangemi-Mancini-Johnson-Laird.pdf},
doi = {10.4324/9781315888538},
isbn = {978-1-84872-118-0},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-09-19},
pages = {-1},
publisher = {Routledge},
abstract = {This chapter addresses the two main mysteries of psychopathology: what causes psychological illnesses and what maintains them. One prevalent view is that both result from faulty reasoning. Yet, healthy individuals also err in their reasoning. The chapter outlines an alternative account, the hyper-emotion theory that attributes these illnesses to emotions of a pathological intensity.
These hyper-emotions enhance patients’ reasoning, which in turn prolongs their illnesses. Empirical studies corroborate this theory.
They show that basic emotions tend to occur al the onset of psychological illnesses, that psychiatrists and patient can identify the strategies of reasoninf in different illnesses, even when the content is held constant, and that patients suffering from a psycholocical illness reason better than control participants about contentspertinent to their illnesses. Psychological illnesses are acordingly disorders in emotion, not intellect.},
keywords = {Emotion, reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {misc}
}
This chapter addresses the two main mysteries of psychopathology: what causes psychological illnesses and what maintains them. One prevalent view is that both result from faulty reasoning. Yet, healthy individuals also err in their reasoning. The chapter outlines an alternative account, the hyper-emotion theory that attributes these illnesses to emotions of a pathological intensity.
These hyper-emotions enhance patients’ reasoning, which in turn prolongs their illnesses. Empirical studies corroborate this theory.
They show that basic emotions tend to occur al the onset of psychological illnesses, that psychiatrists and patient can identify the strategies of reasoninf in different illnesses, even when the content is held constant, and that patients suffering from a psycholocical illness reason better than control participants about contentspertinent to their illnesses. Psychological illnesses are acordingly disorders in emotion, not intellect.
These hyper-emotions enhance patients’ reasoning, which in turn prolongs their illnesses. Empirical studies corroborate this theory.
They show that basic emotions tend to occur al the onset of psychological illnesses, that psychiatrists and patient can identify the strategies of reasoninf in different illnesses, even when the content is held constant, and that patients suffering from a psycholocical illness reason better than control participants about contentspertinent to their illnesses. Psychological illnesses are acordingly disorders in emotion, not intellect.
2.
Basile, Barbara; Mancini, Francesco; Macaluso, Emiliano; Caltagirone, Carlo; Frackowiak, Richard S. J.; Bozzali, Marco
Deontological and Altruistic Guilt: Evidence for Distinct Neurobiological Substrates Journal Article
In: Human Brain Mapping , no 2, pp. 229–239, 2011.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: altruistic, anterior cingulate cortex, deontological, Emotion, fMRI, guilt
@article{Macaluso2011,
title = {Deontological and Altruistic Guilt: Evidence for Distinct Neurobiological Substrates},
author = {Barbara Basile and Francesco Mancini and Emiliano Macaluso and Carlo Caltagirone and Richard S.J. Frackowiak and Marco Bozzali},
editor = {Neuroimaging Laboratory},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Deontological%20and%20Altruistic%20Guilt_%20Evidence%20for%20Distinct%20Neurobiological%20%20Substrates%20(mancini%20et%20al).pdf},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-01-01},
journal = {Human Brain Mapping },
number = {2},
pages = {229–239},
abstract = {The feeling of guilt is a complex mental state underlying several human behaviors in both private and social life. From a psychological and evolutionary viewpoint, guilt is an emotional and cognitive function, characterized by prosocial sentiments, entailing specific moral believes, which can be predominantly driven by inner values (deontological guilt) or by more interpersonal situations (altruistic guilt). The aim of this study was to investigate whether there is a distinct neurobiological substrate for these two expressions of guilt in healthy individuals. We first run two behavioral studies, recruiting a sample of 72 healthy volunteers, to validate a set of stimuli selectively evoking deontological and altruistic guilt, or basic control emotions (i.e., anger and sadness). Similar stimuli were reproduced in a event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm, to investigate the neural correlates of the same emotions, in a new sample of 22 healthy volunteers. We show that guilty emotions, compared to anger and sadness, activate specific brain areas (i.e., cingulate gyrus and medial frontal cortex) and that different neuronal networks are involved in each specific kind of guilt, with the insula selectively responding to deontological guilt stimuli. },
keywords = {altruistic, anterior cingulate cortex, deontological, Emotion, fMRI, guilt},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The feeling of guilt is a complex mental state underlying several human behaviors in both private and social life. From a psychological and evolutionary viewpoint, guilt is an emotional and cognitive function, characterized by prosocial sentiments, entailing specific moral believes, which can be predominantly driven by inner values (deontological guilt) or by more interpersonal situations (altruistic guilt). The aim of this study was to investigate whether there is a distinct neurobiological substrate for these two expressions of guilt in healthy individuals. We first run two behavioral studies, recruiting a sample of 72 healthy volunteers, to validate a set of stimuli selectively evoking deontological and altruistic guilt, or basic control emotions (i.e., anger and sadness). Similar stimuli were reproduced in a event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm, to investigate the neural correlates of the same emotions, in a new sample of 22 healthy volunteers. We show that guilty emotions, compared to anger and sadness, activate specific brain areas (i.e., cingulate gyrus and medial frontal cortex) and that different neuronal networks are involved in each specific kind of guilt, with the insula selectively responding to deontological guilt stimuli.
3.
Gangemi, Amelia; Mancini, Francesco
Guilt and focusing in decision-making Journal Article
In: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, vol. 20, no 1, pp. 1–20, 2007, ISSN: 1099-0771.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: cognition, Emotion, focusing, guilt, mechanism
@article{BDM:BDM536,
title = {Guilt and focusing in decision-making},
author = {Amelia Gangemi and Francesco Mancini },
editor = { John Wiley & Sons, Inc},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/guilt-and-decision-making.pdf},
doi = {10.1002/bdm.536},
issn = {1099-0771},
year = {2007},
date = {2007-01-01},
journal = {Journal of Behavioral Decision Making},
volume = {20},
number = {1},
pages = {1--20},
publisher = {John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.},
abstract = {In this paper we examined the impact of a specific emotion, guilt, on focusing in decision-making. Through the focusing mechanism, when making decisions, individuals tend to restrict their thoughts to what is explicitly represented in the decisional task, disregarding alternatives. In this paper, three experiments are performed to investigate whether an emotional state of guilt can critically guide individuals' focusing, and even prevailing over the focusing mechanism. Guilty emotional state was induced by asking participants to write about a guilty related life event. The emotional state was thus neither generated by nor related to the tasks used in the experiments. Results of the first two studies show that guilt affects focusing in decision-making in the case of only one explicitly specified option (a positive or a negative one). Guilty participants, when presented with a stated option that has predominantly positive characteristics, prefer other, unspecified options over the positive one. Guilty participants faced with a stated option that has predominantly negative features tend to prefer it to other, unspecified, options, instead. Finally, experiment 3 shows that guilty participants presented with two different options (a negative vs. a positive one) having different degrees of explicitness (i.e. they are not equally represented in the decision frame), focus on the negative option, even though the latter was not explicitly represented but only hinted at the end of the text. Overall, these results suggest that guilt emotion state can play a crucial role in either strengthening or reducing the focusing mechanism. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.},
keywords = {cognition, Emotion, focusing, guilt, mechanism},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this paper we examined the impact of a specific emotion, guilt, on focusing in decision-making. Through the focusing mechanism, when making decisions, individuals tend to restrict their thoughts to what is explicitly represented in the decisional task, disregarding alternatives. In this paper, three experiments are performed to investigate whether an emotional state of guilt can critically guide individuals' focusing, and even prevailing over the focusing mechanism. Guilty emotional state was induced by asking participants to write about a guilty related life event. The emotional state was thus neither generated by nor related to the tasks used in the experiments. Results of the first two studies show that guilt affects focusing in decision-making in the case of only one explicitly specified option (a positive or a negative one). Guilty participants, when presented with a stated option that has predominantly positive characteristics, prefer other, unspecified options over the positive one. Guilty participants faced with a stated option that has predominantly negative features tend to prefer it to other, unspecified, options, instead. Finally, experiment 3 shows that guilty participants presented with two different options (a negative vs. a positive one) having different degrees of explicitness (i.e. they are not equally represented in the decision frame), focus on the negative option, even though the latter was not explicitly represented but only hinted at the end of the text. Overall, these results suggest that guilt emotion state can play a crucial role in either strengthening or reducing the focusing mechanism. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.