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1.
Migliore, Simone; D'Aurizio, Giulia; Parisi, Francesca; Maffi, Sabrina; Squitieri, Barbara; Curcio, Giuseppe; Mancini, Francesco
Moral Judgment and empathic/Deontological Guilt Journal Article
In: Psychological Reports, pp. 1-17, 2018.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: altruistic, decision-making, deontological, Emotions, guilt, moral dilemma
@article{Migliore2018,
title = {Moral Judgment and empathic/Deontological Guilt},
author = {Simone Migliore and Giulia D'Aurizio and Francesca Parisi and Sabrina Maffi and Barbara Squitieri and Giuseppe Curcio and Francesco Mancini},
editor = {Sage},
url = {https://apc.it/2018_moral-judgment-and-empathic_-deontological-guilt/},
doi = {doi.org/10.1177/0033294118787500},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-07-19},
journal = {Psychological Reports},
pages = {1-17},
abstract = {People often make complicated decisions to help or to punish perfect strangers. Harming someone or breaking some moral imperative is usually linked to feeling guilt, and several researches suggested the existence of two different kinds of guilt: altruistic/empathic and deontological.
Aim
Our study aimed to investigate the decision-making processes in moral and nonmoral judgments and assess how specific situations in which the subject is close to the victim or flanked by an authority can influence his decisions.
Methods
We used three different moral conditions: Empathic Moral (the decision has made while physically close to the potential victims), Deontological Moral (the decision has made while flanked by an “authority”), and Standard Moral (without any influence); a fourth condition is represented by Nonmoral dilemmas (the subject must make a choice between two different things and this does not cause any harm or victims). Previously, a pilot study was carried out for validating the experimental stories to be used in the main study.
Results
We observed a higher number of utilitarian/positive responses when individuals had to respond to Empathic Moral condition, with respect to Deontological Moral and Nonmoral dilemmas. Moreover, looking at the time needed to read the dilemma, under empathic guilt condition, people tended to be slower in reading the dilemmas than in other conditions and this both in case of positive and negative responses. No significant differences in time needed to effectively respond emerged.
Conclusions
These findings suggested that be physically close to potential victims or be flanked by an “authority” differentially influence the decision-making processes in moral judgment, inducing slower decisions and more utilitarian answers, particularly in the scenario of physical proximity.},
keywords = {altruistic, decision-making, deontological, Emotions, guilt, moral dilemma},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
People often make complicated decisions to help or to punish perfect strangers. Harming someone or breaking some moral imperative is usually linked to feeling guilt, and several researches suggested the existence of two different kinds of guilt: altruistic/empathic and deontological.
Aim
Our study aimed to investigate the decision-making processes in moral and nonmoral judgments and assess how specific situations in which the subject is close to the victim or flanked by an authority can influence his decisions.
Methods
We used three different moral conditions: Empathic Moral (the decision has made while physically close to the potential victims), Deontological Moral (the decision has made while flanked by an “authority”), and Standard Moral (without any influence); a fourth condition is represented by Nonmoral dilemmas (the subject must make a choice between two different things and this does not cause any harm or victims). Previously, a pilot study was carried out for validating the experimental stories to be used in the main study.
Results
We observed a higher number of utilitarian/positive responses when individuals had to respond to Empathic Moral condition, with respect to Deontological Moral and Nonmoral dilemmas. Moreover, looking at the time needed to read the dilemma, under empathic guilt condition, people tended to be slower in reading the dilemmas than in other conditions and this both in case of positive and negative responses. No significant differences in time needed to effectively respond emerged.
Conclusions
These findings suggested that be physically close to potential victims or be flanked by an “authority” differentially influence the decision-making processes in moral judgment, inducing slower decisions and more utilitarian answers, particularly in the scenario of physical proximity.
Aim
Our study aimed to investigate the decision-making processes in moral and nonmoral judgments and assess how specific situations in which the subject is close to the victim or flanked by an authority can influence his decisions.
Methods
We used three different moral conditions: Empathic Moral (the decision has made while physically close to the potential victims), Deontological Moral (the decision has made while flanked by an “authority”), and Standard Moral (without any influence); a fourth condition is represented by Nonmoral dilemmas (the subject must make a choice between two different things and this does not cause any harm or victims). Previously, a pilot study was carried out for validating the experimental stories to be used in the main study.
Results
We observed a higher number of utilitarian/positive responses when individuals had to respond to Empathic Moral condition, with respect to Deontological Moral and Nonmoral dilemmas. Moreover, looking at the time needed to read the dilemma, under empathic guilt condition, people tended to be slower in reading the dilemmas than in other conditions and this both in case of positive and negative responses. No significant differences in time needed to effectively respond emerged.
Conclusions
These findings suggested that be physically close to potential victims or be flanked by an “authority” differentially influence the decision-making processes in moral judgment, inducing slower decisions and more utilitarian answers, particularly in the scenario of physical proximity.
2.
Migliore, Simone; Curcio, Giuseppe; Mancini, Francesco; Cappa, Stefano F.
Counterfactual thinking in moral judgment: an experimental study Journal Article
In: Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 5, pp. 451, 2014, ISSN: 1664-1078.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: aging, decision making, gender, moral dilemma, utilitaristic reasoning
@article{10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00451,
title = {Counterfactual thinking in moral judgment: an experimental study},
author = {Simone Migliore and Giuseppe Curcio and Francesco Mancini and Stefano F. Cappa},
editor = {Sarah F. Brosnan},
url = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00451, citation
https://apc.itwp-content/uploads/2014/05/Counterfactual-thinking-in-moral-judgment-an-experimental-study.pdf, article},
doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00451},
issn = {1664-1078},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-01-01},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
volume = {5},
pages = {451},
abstract = {Counterfactual thinking is thinking about a past that did not happen. This is often the case in 'if only...' situations, where we wish something had or had not happened. To make a choice in a moral decision-making situation is particularly hard and, therefore, may be often associated with the imagination of a different outcome. The main aim of the present study is to investigate counterfactual thinking in the context of moral reasoning. We used a modified version of Greene’s moral dilemmas test, studying both the time needed to provide a counterfactual in the first and third person and the type of given response (in context-out of context) in a sample of 90 healthy subjects.We found a longer response time for personal vs. impersonal moral dilemmas. This effect was enhanced in the first person perspective, while in the elderly there was an overall slowing of response time. Out of context/omissive responses were more frequent in the case of personal moral dilemmas presented in the first person version, with females showing a marked increase in this kind of response.These findings suggest that gender and perspective have a critical role in counterfactual thinking in the context of moral reasoning, and may have implications for the understanding of gender-related inclinations as well as differences in moral judgement.},
keywords = {aging, decision making, gender, moral dilemma, utilitaristic reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Counterfactual thinking is thinking about a past that did not happen. This is often the case in 'if only...' situations, where we wish something had or had not happened. To make a choice in a moral decision-making situation is particularly hard and, therefore, may be often associated with the imagination of a different outcome. The main aim of the present study is to investigate counterfactual thinking in the context of moral reasoning. We used a modified version of Greene’s moral dilemmas test, studying both the time needed to provide a counterfactual in the first and third person and the type of given response (in context-out of context) in a sample of 90 healthy subjects.We found a longer response time for personal vs. impersonal moral dilemmas. This effect was enhanced in the first person perspective, while in the elderly there was an overall slowing of response time. Out of context/omissive responses were more frequent in the case of personal moral dilemmas presented in the first person version, with females showing a marked increase in this kind of response.These findings suggest that gender and perspective have a critical role in counterfactual thinking in the context of moral reasoning, and may have implications for the understanding of gender-related inclinations as well as differences in moral judgement.