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1.
Gangemi, Amelia; Gragnani, Andrea; Dahò, Margherita; Buonanno, Carlo
Reducing probability overestimation of threatening events: An Italian study on the efficacy of cognitive techniques in non-clinical subjects Journal Article
In: Clinica, vol. 16, no 3, pp. 149-155, 2019.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: anxiety disorder, cognitive techniques, cognitive therapy, probability, Trait anxiety
@article{Gangemi2019,
title = {Reducing probability overestimation of threatening events: An Italian study on the efficacy of cognitive techniques in non-clinical subjects},
author = {Amelia Gangemi and Andrea Gragnani and Margherita Dahò and Carlo Buonanno},
editor = {Giovanni Fioriti Editore},
url = {https://apc.it/4_gangemietal-_clinical19-3-2/},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-06-01},
journal = {Clinica},
volume = {16},
number = {3},
pages = {149-155},
abstract = {Objectives: Our study was aimed at evaluating the efficacy and stability of the “Pie Technique”, “Cumulative Probability” and “Inverted Pyramid”, cognitive techniques applied in a clinical context to reduce overestimation of the probability of threatening events.
Method: 319 healthy participants were randomly assigned to one of 8 groups. Groups differed on the level of trait anxiety (high vs. low), and on the cognitive techniques they were to receive (Pie Technique, Cumulative Probability, Inverted Pyramid, Control task). All groups were exposed to an intervention aimed at reassigning the initial probability estimate.
Results: In both high and low trait anxiety individuals, all the techniques successfully produced a statistically significant reduction in the estimation of the perceived probability, while no significant outcome was found in the control task group. This effect was significantly maintained at a 4 week follow up.
Conclusions: Our study shows that the Pie Technique, the Cumulative Probability and the Inverted Pyramid reduce the estimation of the perceived probability of negative events occurring in both high and low trait anxiety individuals. This effect was considerably maintained at a 4 week follow up. The reduction should mainly be attributed to the technique’s power in contrasting the cognitive mechanism of hyper-focalization. The present study takes into account only general threatening events, and not threats specifically related to the different disorders. Moreover, it demonstrates that all the techniques are useful to reduce danger overestimation but in a group of non-clinical individuals. We can’t thus generalize our results to anxious patients.},
keywords = {anxiety disorder, cognitive techniques, cognitive therapy, probability, Trait anxiety},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Objectives: Our study was aimed at evaluating the efficacy and stability of the “Pie Technique”, “Cumulative Probability” and “Inverted Pyramid”, cognitive techniques applied in a clinical context to reduce overestimation of the probability of threatening events.
Method: 319 healthy participants were randomly assigned to one of 8 groups. Groups differed on the level of trait anxiety (high vs. low), and on the cognitive techniques they were to receive (Pie Technique, Cumulative Probability, Inverted Pyramid, Control task). All groups were exposed to an intervention aimed at reassigning the initial probability estimate.
Results: In both high and low trait anxiety individuals, all the techniques successfully produced a statistically significant reduction in the estimation of the perceived probability, while no significant outcome was found in the control task group. This effect was significantly maintained at a 4 week follow up.
Conclusions: Our study shows that the Pie Technique, the Cumulative Probability and the Inverted Pyramid reduce the estimation of the perceived probability of negative events occurring in both high and low trait anxiety individuals. This effect was considerably maintained at a 4 week follow up. The reduction should mainly be attributed to the technique’s power in contrasting the cognitive mechanism of hyper-focalization. The present study takes into account only general threatening events, and not threats specifically related to the different disorders. Moreover, it demonstrates that all the techniques are useful to reduce danger overestimation but in a group of non-clinical individuals. We can’t thus generalize our results to anxious patients.
Method: 319 healthy participants were randomly assigned to one of 8 groups. Groups differed on the level of trait anxiety (high vs. low), and on the cognitive techniques they were to receive (Pie Technique, Cumulative Probability, Inverted Pyramid, Control task). All groups were exposed to an intervention aimed at reassigning the initial probability estimate.
Results: In both high and low trait anxiety individuals, all the techniques successfully produced a statistically significant reduction in the estimation of the perceived probability, while no significant outcome was found in the control task group. This effect was significantly maintained at a 4 week follow up.
Conclusions: Our study shows that the Pie Technique, the Cumulative Probability and the Inverted Pyramid reduce the estimation of the perceived probability of negative events occurring in both high and low trait anxiety individuals. This effect was considerably maintained at a 4 week follow up. The reduction should mainly be attributed to the technique’s power in contrasting the cognitive mechanism of hyper-focalization. The present study takes into account only general threatening events, and not threats specifically related to the different disorders. Moreover, it demonstrates that all the techniques are useful to reduce danger overestimation but in a group of non-clinical individuals. We can’t thus generalize our results to anxious patients.
2.
Mancini, Francesco; D'Olimpio, Francesca; Genio, Marisa Del; Didonna, Fabrizio; Prunetti, Elena
Obsessions and compulsions and intolerance for uncertainty in a non-clinical sample Journal Article
In: Journal of Anxiety Disorders, vol. 16, no 4, pp. 401 - 411, 2002, ISSN: 0887-6185.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: depression, Intolerance for uncertainty, Need for Closure Scale, Padua Inventory, State anxiety, Trait anxiety
@article{Mancini2002401,
title = {Obsessions and compulsions and intolerance for uncertainty in a non-clinical sample},
author = {Francesco Mancini and Francesca D'Olimpio and Marisa Del Genio and Fabrizio Didonna and Elena Prunetti},
editor = {Elsevier ScienceDirect},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/2002_obsession%20and%20compulsions%20and%20intolerance%20for%20uncertainty%20in%20a%20non_clinical%20sample.pdf},
doi = {10.1016/S0887-6185(02)00133-0},
issn = {0887-6185},
year = {2002},
date = {2002-01-01},
journal = {Journal of Anxiety Disorders},
volume = {16},
number = {4},
pages = {401 - 411},
abstract = {It has been hypothesized that decision-making difficulties in patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder may arise from intolerance for uncertainty. We investigated the relationship between obsessivity and intolerance for uncertainty (defined in terms of need for cognitive closure), controlling for state and trait anxiety and depression. We tested non-clinical subjects through the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS), the Padua Inventory Revised (PI-R), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), and the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form-Y; STAI-Y). A principal component analysis showed a lack of correlation between the PI-R and the NFCS subscales. A set of multiple regression analyses performed on PI-R subscales showed that the need for cognitive closure cannot be considered as a strong predictor of obsessions and compulsions. These results speak against the hypothesis that people with high obsessivity have difficulties in taking decisions because of a cognitive need for certainty. We instead argue that difficulties in taking decisions may be related to other specific cognitive beliefs or meta-beliefs.},
keywords = {depression, Intolerance for uncertainty, Need for Closure Scale, Padua Inventory, State anxiety, Trait anxiety},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
It has been hypothesized that decision-making difficulties in patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder may arise from intolerance for uncertainty. We investigated the relationship between obsessivity and intolerance for uncertainty (defined in terms of need for cognitive closure), controlling for state and trait anxiety and depression. We tested non-clinical subjects through the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS), the Padua Inventory Revised (PI-R), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), and the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form-Y; STAI-Y). A principal component analysis showed a lack of correlation between the PI-R and the NFCS subscales. A set of multiple regression analyses performed on PI-R subscales showed that the need for cognitive closure cannot be considered as a strong predictor of obsessions and compulsions. These results speak against the hypothesis that people with high obsessivity have difficulties in taking decisions because of a cognitive need for certainty. We instead argue that difficulties in taking decisions may be related to other specific cognitive beliefs or meta-beliefs.